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 1 
Part I 
Introduction  
In order to make effective and calculated decisions, it is certainly important to have the 
smartest, most proven, business savvy individuals at the helm of the organization. However, 
another key component that is often overlooked is the value of diversity of background. We see 
it in sports—the teams that are most successful have players in each position that offer unique 
strengths to their position, as well as differing backgrounds off the field to bring different views 
and strategies to the locker room. The top 11 quarterbacks of all time—undeniably the best 
decision makers ever to play in the National Football League (NFL)—would not be able to play 
together and create an NFL playoff team, let alone the best team in the league.  
 On the board of a large corporation, this same diversity of background and skillset is 
essential for making the best decisions possible. Women often bring a unique skillset, 
background, and perspective to their role, which is why establishing gender diversity on 
corporate boards in the United States and other countries around the world makes sense, and 
could be hugely beneficial for shareholders.  
 The issue is not recognizing that many corporations in the United States have a gender 
diversity problem. The issue is finding a solution that can work and be effective, without 
diminishing the power and effectiveness of the current board, nor decreasing shareholder value 
or returns. In 2015, only 19.2% of corporate directors in the Fortune 500 were women. Yet 
women comprise approximately half of the U.S. workforce, hold half of all management 
positions, are responsible for almost 80% of all consumer spending, and account for 10 million 
majority-owned, privately-held firms in the U.S., employing over 13 million people and 
generating over $1.9 trillion in sales.1 We have a problem, but this paper is not intended to say 
that we have a problem in the U.S. of which companies are not already cognizant. Promoting and 
establishing gender diversity on corporate boards of publicly held companies is easier said than 
done. The U.S. is the land where capitalism reigns supreme and corporate board decision making 
is dominated by shareholder primacy and profits, and government regulation over the structures 
of those boards would be seen by many as overreaching.  
                                                
1 Why Gender Diversity Matters, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, https://www.2020wob.com/learn/why-gender-diversity-
matters. 
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 In the United States, unlike some states in the European Union, government regulation 
and mandates are not the solution to gender diversity issues. Instead, the solutions need to come 
from within, so that the corporation can maintain its power and control.  
 
Current State of Gender Diversity Globally 
 Many European countries have implemented mandatory quotas to increase gender 
diversity on corporate boards. In 2011, women represented just 15.2% of United States public 
corporate board members.2 The U.S. is by no means the worst performer globally, but aside from 
a few countries in Europe, generally there is no equality among genders at the highest levels of 
publicly traded companies. Norway is the country that is most often discussed in the world of 
corporate gender equality, as their controversial quota law was adopted in 2005, requiring 
companies to achieve 40% female board member representation by 2008 and beyond.3 In 2011, 
the European average was 11.7%, lower than that of the U.S., but that number is not perfectly 
representative, as there is wide variance among EU member states.4 Some countries are 
drastically outperforming their neighbors—Norway over 40%, Sweden and Finland at 28.2% and 
26%, respectively, and then there are others that greatly lag behind—Germany, Luxembourg, 
Italy, and Portugal, with 7%, 6%, 3.6%, and 0.6%, respectively.5 
 In the Pacific Rim, the outlook is more of the same. Australia leads at just 10.6%, 
followed by New Zealand at 9.3% and the Peoples Republic of China at 7.3%.6 It is evident that, 
globally, women are not well represented on the boards of some of the largest companies. 
Furthermore, some of the numbers above are further skewed high based on the different board 
structures in Europe. For example, Germany uses a two-tiered board structure, and the 7% figure 
accounts for female board members that serve on the supervisory board as well, which is much 
larger in size, but much less powerful in decision-making.7  
 Since Norway passed its mandatory quota in 2005, other European countries have begun 
to follow suit. Germany recently passed legislation requiring 30% of supervisory board seats to 
                                                
2 Branson, Douglas M., Women on Boards of Directors: A Global Snapshot, University of Pittsburgh Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2011-05, 1 (Feb. 16, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762615. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Id. 
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be held by women.8 The trend across Europe is certainly that gender diversity has become a hot 
issue, and regulatory efforts are aimed at decreasing the gender gap.9 In the United States, the 
outlook has been just the opposite. From 2004-2011, the U.S. deviated by no more than 0.5% of 
female representation on public company boards from year to year.10 However, since 2011, that 
trend has mildly begun to change in the U.S., as companies begin to progress in gender diversity, 
and are closely approaching the 20%11 mark, thanks to responsiveness to the public and leading 
organizations, such as the NFL, which will be discussed in detail below. 
 
Current State of Gender Diversity in the United States 
 As mentioned above, in 2015 women held 19.2% of board seats in the Fortune 500 
companies, which is up from 16.6% in 2012, a time when even 10% of the Fortune 500 had no 
women whatsoever on their boards.12 The landscape of gender diversity is improving, but not at 
the rate at which it should. Notably, this does paint a somewhat inaccurate picture, as it does not 
account for a theme that we see quite often here in the U.S., which is service on multiple boards 
merely for the appearance of diversity. Corporations often appoint female board members for the 
sake of appearing forward thinking and diverse, when in actuality these women have no real 
power to effect change or share their opinion, since some of them serve on up to seven or eight 
different boards. It is not possible for one person to attend all of the necessary meetings for each 
company, let alone to serve effectively on that many different boards of publicly held companies. 
Growth in gender diversity may still be occurring, but we need to first analyze the root causes for 
the gender gap before we can implement any effectual changes.  
According to a recent survey by McKinsey & Company, the primary obstacle for women 
seeking top management positions is often a deep-seeded culture and attitude issue among the 
male executives currently in charge.13 Women have said that they are ready to make the 
sacrifices in their personal lives to achieve these high ranking management roles, but fear, 
                                                
8 Alison Smale & Clare Caine Miller, Germany Sets Gender Quota in Boardrooms, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 6, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/world/europe/german-law-requires-more-women-on-corporate-
boards.html?_r=0. 
9 Branson, supra note 2, at 4. 
10 Id. at 5.  
11 Soares, infra note 12. 
12 Rachel Soares, 2012 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Board Directors, CATALYST (Dec. 11, 2012).  
13 Sandrine Devillard, Sandra Sancier-Sultan, & Charlotte Werner, Why gender diversity at the top remains a 
challenge, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/organization/why_gender_diversity_at_the_top_remains_a_challenge. 
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possibly rightfully so, that corporate culture would not support their ambitions.14 Some of the 
cultural issues that cause these challenges that women face are the lingering doubt on behalf of 
many male CEO’s and executives about the value of diversity initiatives, coupled with the 
additional stress that is demanded of top executives who are often required to make themselves 
available 24/7, which can pose significantly greater challenges for women.15  
 The second issue of “anytime, anywhere” availability is less persuasive, but the argument 
is simply that this mentality tilts more significantly against women because only 62% of women 
believe that children can coincide with a C-suite career, compared to 80% of men.16 However, 
the argument fails because most men and women agree that running a major public company 
requires this heightened availability in order to succeed in the role, so it would appear that 
chasing these top management positions requires self-selection from both genders. 
 The biggest issue for women and career advancement is the lack of support from their 
male counterparts, and it is often the case that men outwardly support diversity, but fail to 
recognize the many unique challenges faced by women. While about 75% of men agree that 
teams with women are more successful, men are less likely to see the value in diversity programs 
and often feel that too many gender diversity initiatives become unfair to men.17  
 
 Is Change Necessary? 
 It is evident that women are facing difficulties and obstacles on the path to the top levels 
of management, but does that mean that something needs to be done? Ignoring issues of fairness 
and equality, there are certainly strong arguments based on the market and company efficiency 
that suggest that a greater percentage of females on boards would increase company 
performance.18 However, a strong market-efficiency advocate would argue that requiring 
companies to hire female directors could actually decrease business performance, and that the 
only companies capable of benefitting from an increase in gender diversity are the companies 
that voluntarily choose to increase gender diversity.19 A study by Kenneth Ahern and Amy 
Dittmar in fact found that a mandatory increase in female directors could actually lower 
                                                
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 See generally Anne L. Alstott, Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for Legal Design in the United 
States, PACE INT’L L. REV. SYMPOSIUM ED. (Vol. 26:1). 
19 Id. at 43. 
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companies’ share price or earnings.20 Conversely, another salient argument is that women make 
the majority of household spending decisions, and therefore to increase female representation on 
boards would increase the ability to mirror the market.21 Unfortunately, this argument ignores the 
obvious point that many public companies do not manufacture consumer products, and therefore 
have no need to mirror the household market. To both of these arguments, the market-efficiency 
advocate would maintain that the structure of corporate boards has been designed to maximize 
value and efficiency, and so if a board needed more females to increase value, the market would 
ensure that more females became directors.22 This appears to be in line with the U.S. legal view 
of the market, where there is to some extent a belief that “existing companies have optimized 
their mix of directors,” while those that have females benefit from their presence, but those that 
do not have concluded that it would reduce performance.23  
It is certainly important to note that European companies evidence some of the arguments 
for greater company performance after increasing diversity, as the EU has the most empirical 
data on the issue, since the U.S. has never issued a mandatory gender quota. That being said, 
“greater performance” is sometimes defined as a more socially praiseworthy performance, and 
not necessarily improved shareholder vale, share price, earnings or profits, which are the biggest 
factors here in the U.S. For example, a female director’s greater reluctance to lay off workers 
may hurt the bottom line and share prices may fall, but is this seen as value added by retaining 
the jobs and salaries of thousands of workers? This may create problems in the U.S. where 
directors are responsive to shareholders—shareholders that are interested in making money and 
increasing the return on their investment. Generally, it is the opinion of U.S. shareholders that 
socially praiseworthy causes are beneficial if they keep that company in the news, and the 
American public generally looks favorably upon the actions of the company, and therefore will 
purchase great quantities of the company’s product or services. Admittedly, this is the cynic’s 
view of the American market, but there is certainly a valid argument to say that socially 
                                                
20 Id.; See also Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and 
Performance, (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107721 (noting better performance 
metrics of companies with more female directors); David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female Style in 
Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas, AM. ECON. J. (2012) (finding lower short-term profits in firms under 
Norway’s mandatory quota).  
21 See e.g., Women in Mature Economies Control Household Spending, MARKETING CHARTS (May 18, 2010), 
http://www.marketingcharts.com/topics/asia-pacific/women-in-mature-economies-control-household-spending-
12931. 
22 Alstott, supra note 18, at 43. 
23 Id. 
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praiseworthy causes that are simply for the sake of helping others, but not deriving share value, 
are of little to no interest for a disinterested shareholder. Profits drive business decisions at the 
end of the day in the cynical, capitalist, and arguably American view.  
However, it could certainly be the case that we are seeing the carriage come before the 
horse in this situation. The true market-efficiency advocate rationale may just be the argument 
put forth by large corporations that intend to keep doing things the way they always have. There 
is evidence, as shown by the McKinsey study above24, that women are not being given equal 
opportunities to reach top level management because of past opinions held about their gender, 
and corporations have an interest in limiting the regulations that the government enforces upon 
them. Therefore, we must question whether we are simply seeing corporations defending their 
current actions, due to inflexibility and unwillingness to change, or is the market-efficiency test a 
valid argument here in the United States? Whether or not there is agreement with either side of 
the statement above, it is certainly true that the view in the U.S. is that the market is better than 
the government at regulation, and it is one of the most core principles underpinning the 
foundation of the U.S. economy. Therefore, as will be discussed later, changes to increase gender 
diversity cannot come in the form of mandatory regulation in its strictest sense, but will need to 
be uniquely tailored to allow corporate control, yet still become effective in increasing women at 
the top.  
Linda Senden argues that tough top-down regimes for change, such as the mandatory 
quotas that have become prevalent in Europe, are the most effective option.25 However, she 
makes an argument that effectiveness is in the eye of the beholder, noting that effectiveness can 
either be judged by equal outcomes or the creation of equal opportunities.26 America is the land 
of opportunity, and to base our regulations on equal outcomes would be seen by many as an 
intrinsic violation of this country’s founding economic principles. Mitt Romney said it during his 
campaign in 2012: “America is more than just a place. America is an idea. It’s the only country 
founded on an idea. Our rights come from nature and God, not from government. … We promise 
equal opportunity, not equal outcomes. And this idea was founded on the principles of freedom, 
                                                
24 See generally supra note 13.  
25 Linda Senden, The Multiplicity of Regulatory Responses to Remedy the Gender Imbalance on Company Boards, 
10 UTRECHT L. REV. 51, 62 (2014). 
26 Id. 
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free enterprise, self-determination and government by consent of the governed.”27 Linda argues 
for the effectiveness of these tough top-down regimes as a “fast” means of achieving change, but 
is fast what is best for shareholders and the business?28 The voluntary bottom-up self-regulation 
regimes would be far more successful in the United States, especially since a large-scale 
overhaul of the board is never a safe bet. Slow, incremental changes toward our goal would have 
a far greater likelihood of acceptance among publicly held corporations.  
 Changes certainly need to be made, but it may not be the best course of action to follow 
the example of many successful European countries that have shown tremendous growth in 
gender diversity through the use of mandatory quotas. To do so could undermine the very 
attribute that makes the American marketplace what it is. The laissez-faire economic system 
works for the United States and to overhaul that could prove to be a grave mistake in a time 
when we are already concerned with keeping American companies on American soil and 
keeping the corporate earnings of U.S. companies here at home, rather than abroad.  
 
Quotas and Other Mechanisms for Change 
 In Europe, the status of gender representation falls into a wide range, but on average is 
better than the state of the U.S. Gender diversity in Europe currently ranges from 7.9% 
representation on corporate boards by women in Portugal, to 35.5% in Norway, though eight 
European countries have greater representation by women on boards than the U.S. Much of 
Europe, including Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Norway have instituted or are considering 
legislation to institute mandatory quotas requiring a certain percentage of board seats to be filled 
by women. These legislative measures have been met with some skepticism, as companies that 
value their independence feel that their boards are comprised the way they are because a rational 
decision has been made to only select the candidates which are going to be most effective for the 
company’s goals. Another criticism or fear is that these quotas may be promoting diversity, but 
hurting the financial results of companies. Essentially, critics have argued that the female 
directors may either be promoted merely as figureheads, or even worse, that untrained or 
inexperienced women would be promoted to boards in order for companies to come into 
                                                
27 Bronwyn, “America is an idea . . . we promise equal opportunity, not equal outcomes” and h2k’s open thread, NO 
QUARTER USA (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.noquarterusa.net/blog/70082/america-is-an-idea-we-promise-equal-
opportunity-not-equal-outcomes-and-h2ks-open-thread/. 
28 Senden, supra note 25, at 63. 
 8 
compliance with the quotas quickly.29 In the first scenario, the problem is that these women are 
not actually promoting the goals intended by gender diversity, which is to provide a new 
perspective and unique experiences to the existing board. Furthermore, in both scenarios the 
female board members could be taking the seats of potential board members that would have 
been prepared to effectively govern. There are many hard and soft measures that could be 
implemented to solve the gender diversity problem in the United States, but the softer measures 
are far more likely to gain traction in U.S. economic culture.  
 
 Mandatory Quotas 
 Across Europe, countries have been implementing mandatory gender diversity quotas on 
corporate boards. France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway have quotas ranging from 
30-40%.30 Norway was the first to adopt a mandatory quota in 2005, requiring public companies 
to achieve a quota of 40% of female directors by 2008, which has been successful.31 Spain 
followed suit, also mandating a 40% target by the year 2016, so it remains to be seen whether 
companies will come into full compliance, but as the trend across the EU shows, it is highly 
likely to be the case.32 Spain has the potential to shed new light on the attainability of a high 
quota, as Spanish public companies have a steep hill to climb, since the average percentage of 
female directors on corporate boards was 5% at the time of the law’s adoption.33 As we have 
seen in the United States in the past, there can be adverse consequences to mandatory quota laws, 
as companies will do what is necessary in order to avoid penalties, which does not always 
accomplish the goal of the legislation. It cannot be disputed that the goal of mandatory gender 
quotas is to increase the percentage of females on corporate boards for the sake of affording 
women equal opportunities in employment and advancement. In 2006 in the United States, 
“Susan Bayh, wife of former Senator Evan Bayh, sat on eight boards.”34 Shortly after the quota 
law was passed in Norway, one woman was elected to the boards of 18 different companies.35 It 
is simply not possible for any human to effectively serve on that many different boards, and 
                                                
29 Alstott, supra note 18.  
30 Women in economic decision-making in the EU: Progress Report, EUR. COMM’N: JUSTICE (2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf. 
31 Branson, supra note 2, at 6. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 3. 
35 Id. at 8. 
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provide value to each one. It is unlikely that Susan or anyone else in a similar position has any 
significant influence on any one of the boards, let alone all 8 or 18 of them, which does nothing 
to increase opportunities for females to break through the glass ceiling.  
These countries represent the use of the “stick” for gender diversity initiatives, rather than 
the “carrot,” though we will look at some of those as well. The mandatory quota does not fit 
within the United States culture of company and investor choice, capitalism and the free market 
economy, and our overall laissez-faire economic system.36 Furthermore, there is another deep 
seeded reason for the United States’ avoidance of the word “quota,” which is that it would 
certainly be challenged as unconstitutional. Even if the mandatory quotas won acceptance in the 
United States, they would face constitutional questioning, as a potential violation of the Equal 
Protections Clause of the Constitution.37  
The laissez-faire culture of the U.S. economy has been cultivated over many years, and a 
quota does not seem to fit within the U.S. system, even ignoring constitutional issues. In more 
recent history, we have even seen the disappearance of many labor unions and there are simply 
not as many regulations requiring large equity holders to listen to the opinions of other 
stakeholders. Proponents of quotas or other mandatory legislation have argued that the 
government strongly regulates securities law, so therefore this regulation would not be 
completely new. This argument fails to recognize that the securities regulations primarily deal 
with the issues of disclosure of vital information, but do not regulate the actions of companies to 
the extent that a quota would. The United States favors shareholder primacy and market self-
regulation. A mandatory quota simply does not fit within that framework.  
 
Mandatory Disclosure 
 Recently, the United States has enacted legislation known as “Say on Pay,” which 
requires publicly held companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of the highest paid 
executive, often the CEO, to the median employee. This data is not new data. We can generally 
guess, moderately accurately with minimal research, the range of salary that a median employee 
at a company receives, and the highest paid executive’s salary is required to be disclosed. 
Therefore, Americans and anyone else that is interested could have calculated the ratio between 
                                                
36 Alstott, supra note 18. 
37 Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (ruling unconstitutional the use of racial quotas 
in making admissions decisions at a public university).  
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these two salaries or compensation packages on their own, with some margin of guessing error. 
It is safe to say that most people have never made this calculation. Americans could also fairly 
easily find out the ratio of male to female directors that sit on the boards of the largest publicly 
traded companies in the country. Again, most people do not look at this ratio on their own. 
 If the SEC enacted legislation requiring companies to either disclose a ratio or percentage 
of female directors, it may put the issue of gender diversity just enough into the spotlight to 
provide an avenue for change. It remains to be seen whether the Say on Pay legislation will have 
any effect on executive compensation. If it is effective in either lowering executive compensation 
or increasing compensation from the bottom, then it could be evidence that simply disclosing 
gender diversity information could increase the number of females as directors.  
 The SEC has already required that companies disclose board members’ qualifications and 
whether the nomination committees consider diversity.38 It would not be a far stretch to include 
the gender diversity of sitting board members. The SEC did in fact amend Regulation S-K Item 
4079(c)(2)(vi) “to require corporations with a diversity policy to disclose how the policy is 
implemented and how the nominating committee ‘assesses the effectiveness of its policy.’”39 The 
major issue is that the current regulations on considering diversity in the board member 
nomination process are weak, and for this method to be effective, the questions need to be 
improved. In fact, Regulation S-K does not actually define the term diversity, nor does it require 
a board to consider diversity in the nomination process.40 Anne L. Alstott recommends “a 
stronger disclosure strategy [that] might pose sharper questions: Are directors familiar with 
studies of gender bias in decision-making? Did the board take steps to cast a wide net for 
potential directors? How many women were interviewed for recent positions? How does the 
board intend to address diversity in the future?”41 This potentially viable option for increasing 
gender diversity on corporate boards would only require amended legislation to ask more pointed 
                                                
38 Alstott, supra note 18, at 50.  
39 Enkelena Gjuka, Corporate America, It's Time to Increase Gender Diversity in Boardrooms, JURIST - DATELINE 
(Nov. 11, 2013), http://jurist.org/dateline/2013/11/enkelena-gjuka-womens-rights.php.  
40 Id. 
41 Id.; For a cautionary note and a summary of empirical findings on responses to diversity disclosure, see Aaron 
Dhir, Boardroom Diversity and Disclosure: A Nudge in the Right Direction? Commentary, THESTAR.COM (May 31, 
2013), 
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/05/31/boardroom_diversity_and_disclosure_a_nudge_in_the_rig
ht_direction.html. 
 11 
and specific questions as part of mandatory SEC disclosure, in order to create actual 
responsibility of compliance on publicly traded corporations.  
 
 Tax Incentives 
 Another option for promoting gender diversity would be to provide tax incentives on a 
sliding scale for companies that reach a certain threshold or percentage of gender diversity on a 
yearly basis.42 Enkelena Gjuka advocates for a seven-year tax program enacted by Congress to 
increase gender diversity to 20% by the year 2020.43 Gjuka proposes a tax credit for every 
female that is nominated to the board, and gives two reasons for imposing the seven year 
provision: (1) by setting a time constraint, it encourages companies to promote females quickly, 
since the tax credits would only be a limited time offer; and (2) by 2020 Gjuka argues that tax 
credits will no longer be needed, as corporations will have realized the benefit of greater female 
board representation.44 However, this argument is not fully salient, because although there is 
empirical evidence that supports stronger performance by companies that have greater female 
representation, there is also the market-efficiency argument on the other side, as discussed above, 
which says that the number of female directors has already been optimized for maximal firm 
performance.45  
 Gjuka’s argument46 does not account for the fact that there is a strong possibility that 
women are not promoted to corporate boards because of deep-seeded attitudes about their 
capabilities from the male executives. It is possible that male executives’ attitude toward women 
is what is keeping them from board representation, not necessarily a fear that increasing female 
representation would hurt stock performance. Therefore, if the tax incentives are removed by 
year 2020, is that really enough time to remove the attitudes of the other 80% of the board 
members that are male? Furthermore, once the tax incentives are removed, corporations could 
certainly find crafty ways to unseat the females that provided the tax incentive, and immediately 
drop back below the 20% threshold of board representation.  
 
 
                                                
42 Id. at 49. 
43 Gjuka, supra note 39.  
44 Id. 
45 See supra Are Changes Necessary? 
46 See generally Gjuka, supra note 39.  
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Voluntary Pledges 
 Some countries in Europe have gone a route drastically different from the mandatory 
quota regime, and have taken strides that have been effective, and would possibly be accepted by 
U.S. companies. In 2008, the Dutch implemented a “Talent to the Top” program, which required 
companies to add women to their boards, but only if they subscribed to the pledge to do so.47 In 
2006 the Dutch corporate boards averaged only 7% female representation, but that number had 
increased to 20.9% by 2010.48 The “Talent to the Top” program does not impose any strict 
requirements on who must sign, or how many women must be elevated to board member status, 
but considers the “specific circumstances within the organization.”49 There is no punishment for 
any company that does not comply with the pledge, except that the company will not be listed on 
the Talent to the Top website as a pledge company.50 The public and the consumers are the only 
ones that can hold the companies accountable.51 Even with this voluntary structure, the pledge 
has been signed and implemented by the 110 largest Dutch companies, such as Shell, Heineken, 
and Wolters Kluer.52 
 The voluntary nature of this program could work in the U.S. where corporations value 
their freedom to make decisions unilaterally, and without input from the government. It cannot 
be overstated that, in general, corporations in the U.S. believe the market is the best regulator of 
best business practices. That being said, the objective of increasing gender diversity on corporate 
boards is becoming more and more of a hot issue. Using peer pressure to influence change could 
be a viable option for increasing gender diversity in the U.S., because if some of the large 
household names within the Fortune 500 begin signing on to a gender diversity pledge, it is only 
a matter of time before the rest follow suit. Google would not want to be seen by the public and 
its consumers as uncommitted to diversity if Microsoft signs on to a pledge program and makes 
immediate strides of improvement. Voluntary pledges are the most viable option discussed thus 
far for the U.S., but determining the structure of a successful program is vital. 
 
 
                                                
47 Branson, supra note 2, at 10. 
48 Id.  
49 Charter, Talent Naar De Top, 
http://www.talentnaardetop.nl/uploaded_files/mediaitem/Charter_TalentNaarDeTop_EN_03.pdf.  
50 Senden, supra note 25, at 53. 
51 Id.  
52 Branson, supra note 2, at 10. 
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Voluntary Targets and the NFL’s Rooney Rule 
 In early August 2015, The White House held its first Demo Day, highlighting the work of 
female and minority entrepreneurs.53 “President Barack Obama issued a call to action to the tech 
industry, asking companies to step up their game on workforce diversity.”54 14 tech companies 
responded to the call to action, including giants Facebook and Pinterest—who had actually 
announced plans to roll out their own “Rooney Rule” earlier in the summer—which would 
require these companies to consider at least one woman and one minority in the slate of 
candidates for either every open position, or every open senior position, depending on the 
company.55 This new buzzword in the tech industry has come to be known as the “Rooney 
Rule.” 
 After the 2001 National Football League (NFL) season, 67% of the players in the league 
were African-American, but only 6% of the league’s head coaches, two, were African-
American.56 Dan Rooney, President of the Pittsburgh Steelers, was appointed by the NFL to lead 
the Committee on Work Place Diversity for the NFL.57 By 2003, the NFL had adopted the 
Rooney Rule, which mandated that all teams consider a minority candidate as a finalist for any 
opening in the head coach or general manager position, and to conduct an on-site interview with 
that candidate.58 By 2010, the number of African-American coaches in the NFL had increased 
from 6% to 22%.59  
 On November 4, 2010, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar joked that he is often confused 
with the Commissioner of the Southeastern Conference—the other SEC.60 In that luncheon 
speech, Commissioner Aguilar supported the Rooney Rule, noting that the NFL’s rule could be 
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applied to corporate board composition, and specifically, applying the rule as a model for a 
pledge program, like those outlined above.61  
The NFL has seen great success because of the Rooney Rule, and NFL Commissioner 
Roger Goodell recently expanded the coverage of the Rooney Rule, speaking at the first 
“Women’s Summit” at Super Bowl 50.62 The Thursday prior to Super Bowl 50, Goodell 
announced that the NFL would extend the Rooney Rule to require interviewing female 
candidates for executive positions.63 
The Rooney Rule has propelled the NFL exponentially forward with respect to women 
around the game. This year, the NFL saw its first female coaches and female officials on the 
field, in Jen Welter and Sarah Thomas, respectively.64 The Buffalo Bills followed suit, adding a 
female coach as well, Kathryn Smith.65 It is quite possibly the perfect time for U.S. companies to 
follow the example set by the NFL—an organization that undoubtedly cares about profits over 
many other social issues, if you ask Dr. Omalu for his opinion.66 This system would not force 
corporate boards to hire or fire anyone specifically, but simply consider diversity at the final 
stages of the interview and candidacy process. “The NFL moved from lip service to action and 
the results are self-explanatory. It is time for the legal profession and the financial services 
industry to do the same.”67  
 
United States Wrap-Up 
 The United States prides itself on leadership and the ability to promote and influence 
global initiatives. Currently, the U.S. is lagging behind some of its European counterparts as it 
relates the female executives on the boards of publicly traded companies. Due to the culture and 
structure of the U.S. financial and economic systems, change cannot necessarily come from the 
same avenues as it has in many countries across the Atlantic. The U.S. values shareholder 
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primacy and believes in the market’s ability to self-regulate. In order to promote and increase 
gender diversity, change must come from within, or at least appear to. Corporations need to feel 
empowered to make the decision that is in their best interests—a policy which can be achieved 
under the Rooney Rule. The Rooney Rule has the advantages of both quotas and voluntary 
pledge programs. The Rooney Rule is not a mandatory quota, because there would be no 
requirement on how many women are hired to fill board seats. Theoretically, a company is not 
under any obligation to fill a single seat on its board with a female under the Rooney Rule. The 
Rooney Rule is simply an interview quota, requiring there to be a certain percentage of female 
candidates in the final round of interviews, which includes an on-site interview and a tour of the 
facilities (potential facilities would likely be the headquarters or nucleus of business for a large 
corporation). The Rooney Rule is effective in creating change that benefits minorities, but comes 
with the added advantage that the corporations are actively selecting the candidates that they 
want to hire from a larger pool of candidates that includes males candidates, therefore greatly 
decreasing the likelihood that female board members would ever be seen as mere “quota fillers” 
or met with resentment. Mandatory quotas and governmental regulation will not be met without 
severe pushback, and could be seen by many as the opening of a potential floodgate into 
governmental regulation of the markets. The U.S. can move the gender diversity initiative 
forward on a global scale, but it must be done in a way that does not threaten the culture and 
values of the current system.  
 The Rooney Rule, and other voluntary pledge programs like it, has the ability to increase 
gender diversity on corporate boards in a meaningful way that gives real power and influence to 
the females that it benefits. It is beneficial to shareholders because boards are not forced to 
change practices or composition, or hire anyone specifically, but the Rooney Rules is still able to 
promote equality among genders at the executive levels of corporate America.  
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Part II 
Introduction 
Would the world be in this financial mess if it had been Lehman Sisters? was a question 
raised at the World Economic Forum in Davos 200968, following the financial crisis. This 
question triggered international debates looking at the situation of gender diversity on corporate 
boards, which intensively influence our market system and workday life. This paper provides an 
overview of the history and present state of actions and laws establishing gender diversity on 
corporate boards by the European Union, Germany and other Member and Non-Member States. 
We will examine self-enforced voluntary legal actions, as well as, mandatory enforced equality 
laws, like a binding quota. Subsequently, we will be able to understand how the EU and its 
Member States justify these legal measures, while illuminating the differences between 
economic reasoning and a value based approach. 
 
European and German Basic Approaches for Achieving Gender Diversity 
European Union 
“While women make up at least half of the population, their share in the exercise of 
political and economic power has remained at a very low level even in the 21st century.”69 The 
lack of women’s participation in the EU and the economy in general, affects especially their 
representation in companies and corporate boards.70 The EU-average for women in high 
management roles of large listed company boards is still rather low at 17.8 % with significant 
cross-country differences—the lowest in Malta at 2.1% and the highest in Finland at 29.8%.71 
The EU’s average for women represented in executive positions is staggeringly low compared to 
the non-EU member Norway, with an average of 42%.72 Female representation in CEO positions 
is even lower throughout the EU with less than three females in CEO positions out of the 
hundreds of the largest listed companies in Europe.73  
Looking at the EU’s history on sex equality, 1965 ex Art. 119 EEC (later Art. 141 EC), 
was the main law in stating the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, fighting unfair 
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competition between Member States.74 This is equivalent to today’s Art. 157 TFEU75: equal pay 
for work of equal value, which ensures Member States’ positive discrimination actions.76 A 
further progress in favor of gender equality was the Treaty of Amsterdam, which added to Art. 3 
the “aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.”77 Further 
labor equality issues initiatives of EU institutions outside of the normal social and political 
agendas included the first European Ministerial Conference in 1986, which created the Equality 
between Women and Men in Political Life—Policy and Strategies to Achieve Equality in 
Decision Making.78 In 1988, the Committee of Ministers introduced the Declaration on Equality 
Between Women and Men, declaring gender equality as an essential human right and essential 
for democracy.79 This was followed by the Third European Commission’s Pluriannual Action 
Program (1991-1995), which added women to decision-making issues.80 Connected to the 
program’s implementation in 1996, a Recommendation by the Council, addressed the Member 
States to pursue a holistic way of achieving a balanced female representation in “decision-
making bodies at all levels of […] economic life.”81 The Council of Europe focused on its idea of 
equality, declared in The Declaration on Equality Between Women and Men as a fundamental 
criterion of democracy in Istanbul 1997, supporting equal power distribution by overcoming 
fixed gender stereotypes, such as the need for more men in domestic duties by demanding 
“structural change” and “new social order.”82 In 2009, a Declaration by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe embodied the equality concept as an essential democratic 
value, demanding “equal visibility, empowerment, responsibility and participation of both 
women and men in all spheres of public and private life.”83  
In March 2011, the European Commission instituted a voluntary pledge for companies to 
achieve 30% female representation on company boards by 2014 and 40% by 2020, but the plan 
was never realized because by 2012 only 24 companies agreed to the pledge.84 This led to the 
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Commission’s Directive, based on the aforementioned 2011 pledge, which enforced that all 
companies embodied the mandatory 40% on their boards by 2020.85 The latest Commission 
initiative is the Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016-201986: promoting “gender 
balance in economic leadership positions at least 40 % representation of the under-represented 
sex among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges” and “equality in 
decision-making […] among executive directors of major listed companies and in the talent 
pipeline.”87 This initiative seizes suggestions from the 1997 Ministerial Conference in Istanbul 
and is based on the 2012 Commission’s directive (vide supra). 
 
Germany 
The EU overrules national decisions, as a supreme organ of legal procedures. Member 
States developed individual legal actions for female leadership in company boards even before 
the restrictive EU approach of the above illustrated Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 
2016-2019 came into account. For a long time in Germany it was not clear whether to approach 
the problem of female under-representation on company boards with corporate governance tools 
or with other means. The German government agreed in 2001 to cooperate with principal 
business associations on a proposal to promote the equality of women in company boards and 
decision-making positions in the private economy.88 This soft law measure was implemented 
under the notion that the government would not apply any further gender equality legislations 
unless it is obliged to do so by EU law.89 The agreement manifested in a gender diversity 
provision in the German Corporate Governance Code Art. 4.1.5: “When filling managerial 
positions in the enterprise the Management Board shall take diversity into consideration and, in 
particular, aim for an appropriate consideration of women.”90 It should be emphasized that the 
German wording (soll) makes the provision non-binding, along with the lack of clarifying when 
and how the sought “appropriateness” will be rated.91 Nevertheless, most of the German stock 
listed companies set different targets regarding female representation in their boards, ranging 
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from 20% to 30% up until 2011.92 Because the percentage of representation has increased from 
about 11% to 22%, in the following three years, the so called legal comply-or-explain duty, 
implicated in the German Stock Corporation Act (Section 161)93 came into action.94 In 2015, the 
law on Equal Participation of Women and Men in Leadership Positions in the Private and Public 
Sector95 was introduced. On January 1, 2016, a fixed gender quota of 30% came into force in 
Art. 1 sect. 4, para. 1 applying to new supervisory board seats of major companies listed on the 
stock exchange. Around 350096 more companies were obliged to set their own target to increase 
the female proportion of supervisory boards, board of directors and top management level 
through Art. 3 sect. 76 para. 4 Stock Corporation Act.97 The law aims at improving the 
proportion of women in leading positions and to achieve a gender balance (Art. 1 sect. 1). 
Manuela Schwesig, current German Federal Minister of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women 
and Youth states that: “the law is an historic step for the equal rights of women in Germany. 
Hence the law not only acts in leadership positions, but reaches millions of women concretely.”98 
This quota regulation is effective through Art. 11 No. 2 b for stock corporations and limited 
partnerships on stocks with more than 2000 female and male employees and European 
Companies (SE), where the supervisory and administrative body consists of the same number of 
shareholders and labor representatives99. In case of non-compliance, the election is void and 
intended chairs for the underrepresented sex stay legally vacant (“empty chair”), Art. 14 No. 1 
a.100 
Critics fear a violation of the principles of equal treatment, Art. 3 para. 2 GG101 and of non-
discrimination, Art. 3 para. III GG by the quota.102 
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Different Justifications for Legal Actions Promoting Gender Diversity: 
Economic Advantages vs. Constitutional Values 
To understand the reasons for pursuing gender diversity on company boards it is vital to 
scrutinize suitable measures e.g., out of economic benefits, or moral values for the society, 
politics and law. 
 
Economic Reasoning 
A financial argument for gender diversity, is the economic, business case argument 
pursuing a business’s need for more gender balanced boards to improved company’s 
efficiency103, (though there is skepticism about its actual outcome104) improving quality of 
decision-making, corporate governance and ethics, as well as resorts of the talent pool, leading to 
innovation and market presentation.105 Specific actions, based on economic reasoning, are often 
soft law measures: “Self-regulatory approaches may be induced [...] by the business case 
rationale and developed […] as part of corporate social responsibility policy, as reflected in 
corporate governance codes.”106 An example is the Polish Warsaw Stock Exchange Management 
Board which connects gender balanced participation creativity and innovation of business’s 
economic actions or the Swedish Corporate Governance Board companies need to maintain need 
to a responsible and sustainable behavior, comprising gender equality, thus becoming 
trustworthy in public.107 
 
Value Justification 
A value-oriented reason for gender diversity is the individual, equal opportunities 
justification: achieving a gender power balance corporate boards is linked to individual fairness. 
Equally qualified women should have equal access like men to boards, which would be 
beneficial for the society as a whole “affect[ing] the economic, financial and social life of all 
citizens.”108 
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Moreover the societal, public interest and fundamental rights argument focusses broadly 
on a balanced representation through social justice and democratic legitimacy. These are EU core 
values, which build a political and economic system in which in legal terms translates into the 
principle of equality and of equal opportunities.109 Experience showed that in Member States 
without specific regulation no major critical awareness has risen to actively support gender 
balance. None of the mentioned justifications have been sufficient or convincing by the public 
regulator or by industry to act. These nations trust in the application of the general thought of 
equality, but no proactive approach to overcome persisting inequalities in this domain have 
arisen yet.110  
 
Different National Value Types  
Compared to this the Norwegian quota model is rather invasive, not justified through the 
business case rationale, but the claim that achieving equal participation is a democratic value, 
seeing equality as a contribution for fairness, power balance and affluence in society.111 This is a 
prime example that international differences affect regulatory and enforcement choices, reasons 
for international differences. Firstly they are influenced by the Member State’s type of political 
and welfare system and cultural differences: Diverse political, socio-economic and cultural 
contexts in which companies and employees work affect the problem of under-representation, as 
well as, regulatory solutions and instruments built to resolve it.112 “The proportion of women on 
corporate boards is likely to be lower in countries exhibiting high masculinity.”113 In the UK for 
instance which is typified as a liberal welfare system114, the self-regulatory approach still 
prevails.115 
In a few countries, pro-active measures were only taken due to strict legal regulation 
where no active measures came up, no legal or political tradition and have been applied. France 
requires legislative and constitutional checks before any quota rules may be adopted.116 Before 
the quota rule came to force in Germany, doubts covered the constitutionality, the conformity 
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with the freedom of property, the freedom of association, and the principle of equality are 
understood under the German Constitution.117 In Finland, the currently applicable constitutional 
provision would only allow for a soft quota system.118 In Norway, the introduction of the hard 
quota was received easier because these rules already existed in the legal system and have been 
enforced in other fields, which left their constitutionality doubtless.119 
 
Economic Reasoning Overshadows Values 
“There is a large gap between the proportion of employed and well-educated women and 
those sitting on the boards of EU companies.”120 Looking at the above presented Commission’s 
proposal for a Directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of 
companies listed on stock exchanges does not seem to be a convenient legal solution: “The 
Commission’s reasoning [of] the draft Directive is so strongly pervaded by economic 
considerations that it gives the impression that women are merely instruments useful to attain 
economic objectives.”121 The urge to promote female representation could be justified rather by 
social oriented values, including gender equality, as well as the necessity of democratic 
legitimization of the EU and of its economic governance to promote the tandard of 
proportionality and subsidiarity.122 Gender equality among European company managers could 
find justification in EU constitutional values like the equality between women and men Art. 23 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the social market economy, Art. 3 para. 3 TEU 
and democracy, Art. 2 TEU. As well as in the general rule of EU law, Article 6 para. 3 TEU.123 
Furthermore critics utter there might be no correlation between advanced economic performance 
due to a higher female proportion which offers an excuse for companies to prlongue the need and 
value of having more female representation on the boards.124 “Corporate governance and 
performance may be improved by board appointments of the best possible candidates 
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(irrespective of sex) and meeting all relevant criteria, not simply by the appointment of 
women.”125 
 
Comply or explain approach 
One solution to quota skepticism is the comply-or-explain approach for diversity.126 The 
best known proposal where "companies with a lower proportion, less than 30% women on their 
boards, would have to explain [in their annual reports] if they proposed to fill a vacancy with a 
man."127. Research found out that by asking why individuals took certain actions advance the 
decision-making quality, reduce stereotype thinking, and create space for underrepresented 
groups.128 Diversity rulings are often introduced as essential to good governance, an example for 
comply or explain approach requirements is: “listing rules of several stock exchanges require as 
part of their agreement with listed companies that the companies ‘comply’ with governance 
requirements or ‘explain’ why they do not.”.129 The European Council is planning a directive 
requiring large publicly traded firms to present their board diversity-policy and its results, 
corporations without that policy, must provide a "clear and reasoned explanation as to why this is 
the case."130 Denmark created two laws since 2012: the Gender Equality Act and the Companies 
Act. The laws make it obligatory for private and public companies to set concrete and realistic 
aims and establishing a recruitment policy, including a comply-or-explain approach. (companies 
must disclose annually about the implementation this policy and, explain why the objective was 
not realized. If it fails to report on this, a fine may be imposed.131 
 
Legal Instruments in Action in the EU 
Legislations of many EU Member States have quotas or mandatory targets which regulate 
gender proportions on company boards, varying in sanctions and number of corporations. States 
operating with obligatory targets for female presence on individual company boards impose 
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sanctions for non-compliance. Others have softer statutory quota laws, which are neither binding 
nor connected to any injunctions. The legislation of a few countries only concerns state owned 
corporations or local authorities (excluding private companies). Countries with the least 
developed quotas for public undertakings came into force through administrative regulation, 
without direct legislation.132 
 
Quota 
Hard public law is one way to achieve gender diversity, by introducing binding quota 
regimes. The non-EU Member State Norway is an international role model for hard public law in 
2006, introducing a legal sanctioned quota that mandates representation of 40% of both genders 
on company boards, for both public limited and state-owned companies.133. The quota became 
mandatory as companies failed to raise female representation under the soft law.134 The sanction 
for non-compliance is forced liquidation.135 Also the registration of company boards is 
prohibited if the balanced representation is not reached.136 Supportively, the Norwegian 
government set up a database for companies where qualified female applicants can have their 
CVs evaluated.137 The majority of companies succeeded in complying with the quota within the 
two-year transition period. 138  
Other European countries followed, most recently Germany, like stated above. France 
passed a quota law requiring listed and non-listed major private, and state owned companies, to 
uphold a gender proportion of at least 40%.139 Corporations with only male board members 
should fill any vacant seat with a woman, the sanction in case of legal non-compliance means the 
invalidity of any director’s assignment.140 Legislative mandatory gender quotas are largely 
politically debated but are considered more and more. Like in Belgium, since 2011, concerning 
public undertakings, the law demands “at least a third of the members of the board of directors 
appointed by the Belgian State or by a company controlled by the Belgian State shall be of a 
                                                
132 Szydło, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2014, 172. 
133 See Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, in Section 6-11a. 
134 Kristen, 26 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 68, 2014, 70. 
135 Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, in Section 16-14. 
136 Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, in Section 16-17 (3). 
137 Ahern, Dittmar, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012, 137, 145. 
138 Hastings, Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Women in the Boardroom, 57. 
139 Law 2011-103 of 27 January 2011, Journal Officiel, 28 January 2011. 
140 Gresy, De Vos & Culliford, 2014, 123 f. 
 25 
different gender from the other members”.141 If the company does not comply, the following 
director’s appointment will be null.142 An Italian Act regulates “that [more] company statutes 
must ensure that directors and auditors of one sex cannot be elected in a proportion greater than 
two-thirds compared to directors and auditors of the opposite sex”143 of listed companies and 
state subsidiaries.144 The National Securities and Exchange Commission is in charge of 
controlling this process and can warn that the quota application should comply within four 
months and, if non-compliant a fine up to 1 million € (up to 200.000 € for auditors) can follow; if 
no action took place by a second warning if the quota is not achieved within three months. If the 
company fails to implement this, dissolution of the board might occur.145  
 
Alternate Legal Instruments  
“Quotas are not the end of the possibilities for securing female representation in 
corporations, and more generally, in the workplace.”146 There are different tactical categories, 
like focusing on increasing the candidate’s skills, motivating corporations to take voluntary 
actions and the law. To increase the representation of women on boards, state authorities or 
corporations can adopt corporate governance codes individually; companies can sign charters, 
certificates or pledges realizing quantitative aims for female boardroom-representation; 
stakeholders can initiate special recruiting, training, mentoring and networking activities.147 
Moreover databases promoting female candidates could be created, or campaigns raising the 
sensitivity of social partners and businesses towards gender balance in boardrooms148. 
Regulatory approaches of boards’ gender balance range from no regulatory action to softer in 
public and private institutions. In some Member States self- or co-regulatory and public law 
approaches may come to force parallel, because of the distinction between private and state-
owned companies, and left to their discretion.149 The softest of all approaches can be achieved 
through so called conditioned self-regulation or co-regulation.  Those and other measures are 
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essential for raising public awareness, employees and company management need to change 
organizational practices and consensus-building.150 To achieve cultural change in the 
organization of corporation’s acceptance, flexibility and a positive framing is more effective than 
punishment.151 For instance Finland selected a self-regulatory approach implemented through the 
Corporate Governance Code for public and private corporations in 2010, not explicitly 
demanding an equal gender distribution of board seats, the required action are left to the 
employers own execution.152 The Hungarian Equality Act only demands an adoption of an equal 
opportunity plan only for public employers, (without content-scrutiny and only soft provisions) 
not adopting such a plan imposes fine.153 Mostly initiatives by public authorities setting certain 
quantitative targets, which are of little legally binding nature and sanctions of non-achievement 
and non-compliance:154 Spain recommended in a law of 2007 that major corporations should 
reach at least 40% of each gender on company boards before 2015155, but no sanctions are 
attached to this rule, only a duty for companies to state their board’s gender composition of in 
their annual reports.156 Ireland set a target in 2011 of 40% of each gender for all state boards, till 
today this does not have any legal implication.157 No specific measures (like from the legislator) 
promoting gender diversity yet have been adopted, in mainly the latest EU-acceded Member 
States, like in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech republic, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and 
Slovakia, as well as in founding EU Member States: Luxembourg and Portugal.158 Where there is 
no binding public regulation, initiatives make corporations pay attention to gender imbalances: 
mostly within corporate governance codes (which often only apply to stock listed companies), 
and are phrased rather widely, not setting any hard standards.159 The Dutch Talent to the Top 
program created an online platform where companies can publicly pledge to commit themselves 
to promoting gender diversity, which is very much voluntary and without any sanctions.160 The 
UK introduced the FTSE 100 Cross-Company Mentoring Executive Programme, offering 
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mentoring and related services to high-potential women within the 100 highest value stock 
companies on the London Stock Exchange, the aim is the connection of women, Chief 
Executives and Chairmen.161 Forcing corporations to give information about retention, 
recruitment, and the promotion of women, creates transparency162, would open the companies’ 
consciousness concerning inclusion of women, preventing discrimination.163 Another necessity is 
their search expansion, beyond traditional CEO types, considering different corporate executives, 
nonprofit directors and officers, and academic presidents and experts.164 “What's holding women 
back [is] the fact that no one ever leaves the boards."165 Board members do not want to give up 
their power, linked to prestige and a high salary.166 This leads to an increasing average age of 
directors: 40% of public corporation managers are age 68 or older.167 
Legal strategies can remove obstacles to women, wishing to enter in leadership positions. 
An idea is demanding companies "over a certain size to disclose data concerning recruitment, 
retention, and promotion."168 Another legal strategy would be to strengthen enforcement 
resources for anti-discrimination initiatives. Still state and federal equal opportunity agencies 
could be more proactive in investigating organizations with a poor performance on gender 
equity.169  
 
Does Diversity Pay Off?  
How to Access Diversity 
As we have seen above in Chapter (IV), the business case argument for diversity on 
corporate boards is generally the most striking legitimization for mandatory quota laws, even if 
lesser used than the value approach. Today several studies exist, indicating positive correlations 
between enhanced female representation on company boards and a better business 
performance.170 At the same time, negative or simply no significant outcome is also often 
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determined.171 Evaluation of effectiveness depends on whether we see the main goal in a creation 
of potential equal opportunities between men and women, or if we just judge the de facto equal 
representation on company boards.172 While the equal opportunity attempt is often 
institutionalized by self-regulatory and soft gender equality laws, the outcome orientated 
approach is often embodied by different hard quota regimes, as mentioned in Chapter (V).173 
Also the EU Commission concluded that: “legal instruments to enforce quotas are effective and 
fast means of achieving change”174, and commits itself thereby to hard quota law enforcements. 
In its Draft Direction uses arguments, based on three economic advantages, which are also the 
main argumentative pillars in the other, considerable body of literature:175 At first it is often 
mentioned that a more balanced allocation among the sexes in corporate boards would enhance 
productivity through a more efficiently used workforce.176 Secondly, it is argued that gender 
equality in corporate boards leads to a better decision-making and monitoring of the companies 
actions.177 This assumption rests on theories, highlighting the idea that women were “more 
financially risk averse”178, while others believe in a wider variety of viewpoints179 or a better 
resistance to internal board conflicts.180 However, the third economic advantage is the 
assumption, that increased female representation on corporate boards leads to an overall better 
financial performance (at the stock market, overall profits and foreign invested capital) of the 
company.181 
Looking at the most mentioned disadvantages of gender diversity on corporate boards, 
we can divide those into two kinds of arguments. Those doubting the research validly, predicting 
a positive correlation and those who claim disadvantages are caused by enhanced gender 
diversity on boards directly. Despite the comprehensive researches, there seems no clear 
evidence that diversity leads vice versa to an improved financial performance.182 Many studies 
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are overshadowed by the reproach of “serious methodological flaws”183, while the critique is: a 
selective approach choosing the companies’ financial parameters, that they only portray the 
wanted positive relationship.184 Moreover the studies often do exhibit their selection pattern, how 
the companies were chosen.185 Another point of criticism is the short-term periods of the 
mentioned studies,186 therefore a long-term observation of the company’s stock market 
shareholder value is not connectable to diversity specific findings.187  
The different studies are connected to country-, cultural- and company-specific backgrounds, 
which often preclude the view of a wider, global market context.188 Because of this, the 
correlation between diversity and financial benefits is often of an anticipated and indirect 
nature.189 For example, some scholars claim that the female representation on boards has no 
direct financial impact, but due to its appearance as a diverse board, shareholders may invest 
convinced of the company’s innovativeness.190 This argument is underlined by the fact that 
studies which predict a positive financial correlation, often derive from countries without an 
enforced legal gender quota.191 Furthermore, some mentioned disadvantages are of a general 
nature, like predicted changes in companies’ financial performance, as an effect of a 
“dysfunctional transition period[s]” 192. Some may argue that the mentioned reasons for 
efficiently used human capital in corporations had no value, because not the best but the most 
appropriate candidates (gender-based), enter the boards.193 The tendency to appoint women is 
less a case in self-regulatory regimes but just to accomplish an enforced legal quota system.194 
Therefore we should spotlight on quota-specific disadvantages. Against mandatory quotas, 
experience in Norway where still only 3% of CEOs are female, in spite of the quota for board 
members there, thus arguing that the ‘trickle down’ effect of mandatory measures is virtually 
non-existent.14195  
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Does the Quota Pay Off? 
Women, who are lacking experience as quota placements on corporate boards, are known 
as the trophy director phenomenon196 or the golden skirt effect197. Forced by a quota companies 
tend to reduce the board size to maximize the effect of the few female “trophies”. 198 At the same 
time these trophy directors help the company to present a pluralistic image, refraining from 
further efforts.199 This concerns critics that legal gender quotas have, on top of the already given 
questionable profitability, also a general negative impact on gender equality.200 
On the other hand, though an academic proof of a positive correlation should miss, the same 
applies for the critic’s studies, because most of them are lacking longtime empirical negative 
evidence.201 Surely, gender quotas are able to “alter business structures for integration of women 
into leadership positions”202, while we have seen that voluntary soft measures often miss any 
progress or do even stop them. 203 The just work in coexistence with mandatory quota 
instruments, as we have seen in Norway and Finnalnd.204 The trap could be, that the industry 
longs for positive correlations to be open for voluntary approaches205and as those are lacking any 
evidence, they are vulnerable for circumventions. 
 
Conclusion 
All in all it is certain that the issue of gender diversity on corporate boards and its legal, 
self-regulatory or mandatory implementation will remain highly controversial. In Chapter (II), 
we examined the EU’s history on gender equality from the first attempt of Equal Payment in 
1965 to today’s Draft Directive of the Commission. The gender diversity discussion in Germany 
mirrors this long-term development best, portraying the power of obligatory laws and 
recommendations of the EU and its Commission: from soft self-regulative measures to a 
mandatory quota. Still, the German example is an average approach of diverse strategies among 
Member States. Legal actions regarding gender diversity demand justifications, which we 
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surveyed in Chapter (III). We found out that the economic reasoning is often used as incentive 
for self-regulatory approaches while mandatory quota laws mostly find their justifications based 
on fundamental rights arguments. Despite this pattern, the EU Commission falls out of this frame 
by highlighting primarily economic considerations in its Directive. While examining the 
functioning and variety of regulatory gender laws in the EU in Chapter (IV) it became evident, 
that the multiplicity of national strategies were often limited by the countries’ perception of the 
advantages of diversity. Chapter (V) hence presented the most contested issue of diversity: its 
effectiveness. Pro-diversity studies and their critics helped understanding the debate, but their 
arguments balanced each other in the end. More rewarding instead was the question of how to 
measure effectiveness: countries’ particular evaluation ways are either based on equal 
opportunities or the practical outcome of female board representation. The pitfall of legal gender 
equality enforcement crystalized. As governments have to legitimate their legal actions, they 
tried to offer companies a self-regulatory approach while pledging for positive economic effects 
of diversity. Softer approaches failed due to the board’s unwillingness and their appointment of 
trophy directors, challenging the equal opportunity attempt. The mandatory measures which 
came therefore to force got justified by value arguments. Companies require evidence for 
economic benefits out of gender diversity and even mandatory quotas cannot achieve this in a 
short run, the legal strategies for diversity on corporate boards risks to become an only “nice 
thought” but at the same time just a political straw fire. In the end, despite a lack efficiency 
evidence, mandatory gender quotas can alter business structures in accordance with the EU’s 
Equality Values and might seem the only chance to make any, even if little, change. 
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Part III: Co-Authored by Tyler Winters and Madhuri Jacobs-Sharma 
 
The United States’ Perspective: Why A Quota Wouldn’t Fly 
 A Constitutional Objection 
 In 1995, the Italian Constitutional Court206 held that a constitutional challenge against 
two laws regulating gender diversity in elections was valid, because Article 3.2 of the Italian 
Constitution sanctions substantive equality, but the Court determined that was not enough for the 
adoption of affirmative actions measures in the political sphere. Although the EU has seen 
mandatory quotas in a substantial subset of its member-states, the Constitution can be used as a 
defense mechanism against this type of legislation.  
 In the United States, a constitutional challenge would certainly arise if a mandatory 
gender quota for corporate boards were passed. The Equal Protections Clause of the Constitution 
has been read to stand against the use of a mandatory quota to benefit a minority.207 The first 
challenge that a quota in the realm of gender diversity would face is whether women are a 
minority, and then if so, whether they deserve constitutional protection. In the Bakke case, the 
court specifically noted that classifications that treat people as groups rather than individuals are 
problematic on their face, and that a desire to increase minorities in the medical profession is not 
a legitimate state interest.208 It is hard to see why there would be any way to justify a legitimate 
state interest in increasing the number of women on corporate boards. Even if the quota would 
pass the legitimate state interest test, it would again be difficult to see how one could say that a 
mandatory quota would pass the next constitutional test, and be seen as “narrowly tailored” to 
achieve that legitimate state interest. 209 As American constitutional law stands today, there is no 
doubt that minority status can be considered in admissions and hiring decisions. Quotas, on the 
other hand, are unconstitutional because you have the reverse discrimination argument on the 
other side. For example, imagine that at a large company there was only one opening for a board 
seat, and there were only two applicants for that seat. One applicant was a male and one was a 
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female. The board is 1% below a hitting a mandatory quota set the by U.S. government for 
female board members. The male applicant was the youngest person ever to serve on a Fortune 
500 board and he is an expert in the industry of this company. The female has never served on a 
board, and is actually more than four steps down the corporate ladder in terms of experience seen 
as essential for becoming an effective board member. Does the United States really want to 
implement a policy that could potentially deny a seat to the best candidate? Quotas go too far, 
but gender should undeniably be considered as a factor in the conversation. A case from 
Michigan Law School stands for the proposition that diversity can be considered in the process, 
within the bounds of the Constitution.210 Strict scrutiny over whether the policy is narrowly 
tailored to achieve the end of the legitimate state interest is required, but the court found that 
affirmative action in admissions decisions was a constitutional exercise of the state’s interest in 
improving diversity in higher education. A similar process would be equally likely to pass 
constitutional muster in the realm of gender diversity in hiring practices. The question before us 
today is not where exactly we draw that line, but certainly gender should be considered in hiring 
practices, and, with all other qualities of candidacy being equal, giving the edge to the female 
candidate may be the best policy for achieving diversity in that example. Unfortunately, that is 
not the stage of the current issue that we face. Indisputably, mandatory quotas would not be 
effective, nor constitutional, in the United States. However, in order to see the benefits from any 
type of gender affirmative action program on corporate boards, we need to find a solution for 
putting women in the position to be interviewed for those seats in the first place.  
 Ruth Rubio-Marin notes that this anti-classification reading of the Equal Protections 
Clause (EPC) has gained strength over other readings of anti-subordination, as a mandatory 
gender quota would violate the gender-neutral reading of the EPC.211 Rubio-Marin is one of the 
few scholars who noted that the mandatory quotas are not necessarily unchallenged 
constitutionally in Europe.212 Both Italy and France required constitutional amendments prior to 
implementing mandatory quotas.213 Constitutional challenges are not a new concept in Europe 
where mandatory quotas have been the answer for many countries’ gender diversity issues. In the 
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United States, the Constitution would prevent a mandatory quota from taking effect, and based 
on previous court decisions, has defeated mandatory quotas before they could even start.  
 
Cultural Objections 
Undoubtedly, any mandatory quota would face a strong constitutional objection, but a 
mandatory quota should be seen as a last resort for the United States. Soft measures should come 
first. Either using a voluntary pledge program similar to the Dutch’s Talent to the Top program, 
or something drafted similarly to the Rooney Rule, would allow corporate board members and 
decision makers to feel empowered. If the United States government passed legislation tomorrow 
that required a mandatory gender quota for X% of board seats by some date in the distant future, 
corporations would immediately feel threatened and either implement defensive or aggressive 
strategies. The choice to respond either defensively and protect the current way of doing things, 
or aggressively challenging the legislation, is not important. Either way, the new “quota” board 
members become the targets and are the people that are forcing these boards to change their 
equations for success. This creates multiple problems within the organizations and has a greater 
opportunity to hurt large corporations in the short-term.  
 Conversely, if the United States could implement a voluntary pledge program—
admittedly tackling the question of “who” should start this initiative is another question in 
itself—corporations that sign on to the pledge could feel like they are part of the conversation. It 
would give major public companies the ability to sign on to a pledge that makes them look good 
in the eyes of the public and their consumers. Filling board seats with women would be seen as a 
positive and active decision made from within, and just maybe, these new board members could 
influence the company with real power, and still allow the board to drive increased shareholder 
value through the public good will that stems from increased gender diversity at the executive 
level.  
 In a mandatory quota regime, companies are forced to hire people that they do not 
necessarily plan to ever hire, which obviously could create animosity among the board. In that 
situation, in order to come into compliance with the regulation, what happens to current board 
members that have been effective during their time on the board? Are companies supposed to ask 
seasoned members to step down to be replaced because of legislation—which would cause 
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further constitutional complications,214 or should companies simply add board seats and dilute 
the power of the individual members, and potentially decrease shareholder value because of it? 
To provide another example, imagine a corporation—albeit a small one—that only has 10 board 
seats. If a 40% mandatory gender quota were implemented, the company has two potentially 
very bad outcomes. First, it could hire seven female board members (7/17 is 41.1%), adding 
seven new seats to the board, and significantly decreasing the power of all of the current board 
members. Alternatively, the board could remove four of the current directors, who may 
presumably be doing a good job, and replace those board members with four new females. A 
voluntary pledge program would allow companies to avoid both of these issues.  
Companies should be hiring more women. Companies should be promoting more 
women. More women should be effective and powerful members of the boards of the Fortune 
500 in the United States. That being said, companies should be given the opportunity to make 
this decision on their own, with just a small nudge in the right direction. Let the companies 
derive shareholder and consumer goodwill from changing their hiring practices to conform to 
industry standards. If Ford signed onto a mandatory pledge and receives public praise, is there 
anyone that believes that General Motors would not sign onto that very same pledge? If a 
company like Google signed on, the ripple effect it would have in the tech space would be 
unfathomable.  
 Mandatory quotas in the United States will not lead to truly increased diversity on 
corporate boards. It is already an issue in the United States that a few women sit on many 
different boards as “trophy directors.”215 They are simply there to fill the role of increasing 
diversity for that company, but do not have any effective power for decision-making. To 
implement a mandatory quota runs a severe risk that any new female board members will be seen 
as “quota fillers” or met with outright resentment from the other board members. 
 
A European View of US Law on Gender Equality 
While the discussions on gender diversity in the EU are often mirrored by debates on 
established or newly introduced corporate governance codes, the overall picture across the 
Atlantic is actually different. On its roots, the gender gap in U.S. business boards remains with 
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15.7 % of female board membership (compared to 16.6 % in the EU) one of the widest in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries.216 
Moreover in the US the percentage of female representation in leadership positions 
changed from an already flattening figure to a mere stagnation since 2004, which is often 
explained by the financial crisis and its aftermaths.217 In general the discussion’s approach is also 
extremely different, as: “support for diversity [in the U.S.] has grown in principle, but progress 
has lagged in practice, and controversy has centered on whether and why diversity matters”.218 
Therefore, it should be highlighted where the differences between the U.S. and the EU are 
rooting out, how the concrete state measures for gender equality are justified and applied in the 
country and in front of cultural-specific backgrounds. 
 
Quota: Why It Might Not Fly in the US That Easily? 
The primary differences between the EU and the U.S. concerning gender equality 
measures can be found in different fields, namely: specific U.S. law, an exceptional business 
culture and social structure of the country. All these differences come into account while 
discussing hard and invasive equality-laws, which are eminently embodied by a mandatory 
quota.  
Some argue that quotas for female directors would be necessary in the U.S. to overcome 
structural impediments and to help women directors reach or exceed a critical mass.219 
 
The Specific U.S. Law 
In the U.S. the functioning and mere concept of a gender quota, seems as a: “cultural and 
legal oddity in the United States; a European transplant unlikely to take root [t]here”220. The 
main reason therefore is the fact that any quota system on the basis of sex violates the U.S. 
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.221 At the national level, the handling of business 
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regulations in the U.S. is very exceptional and mirrors the neo-liberal attitude and basis of U.S. 
business law222 as well as the overall political attitude to keep entrepreneur‘s backs “as free as is 
consistent with public order.”223 This basis is also incorporated in state law, which sets limited 
boundaries for corporations, “in the service of economic efficiency.”224 The general attitude 
denies any competence of the central state in this field.225 Because of this liberal attitude, state 
corporate law in the U.S. is generally seen as an inappropriate way to introduce mandatory 
quotas, as it also affects the inner competition between the U.S. States.226  
 
Business Culture Reasons 
Even if a mandatory gender-quota could withstand the constitutional differences of U.S. 
law, the regulation itself would generally stand against the nation's laissez faire business 
ideology.227 While the EU has a strong welfare state tradition since the end of World War II, 
enabling state interventions in the economy and employment regulations, the U.S. traditions do 
not offer these possibilities.228 On the contrary the U.S. economy is strictly against any industrial 
policy or planning by a central state, while the isolated worker-units just offer a limited base for 
grass root-claims for gender-equality.229 On a higher level, the discussions on gender equality in 
the U.S. mainly focus on the why and not on the how of women’s participation in corporate 
boards should be enhanced.230 At the same time the discussions in the EU predominantly circle 
around the question of appropriateness of mechanisms to achieve this goal.231 
But while the economic evidence in the U.S. discussion is predominant, some anticipate 
that even a clear positive correlation of higher company earnings through expanded women’s 
participation in boards would be proven, quotas would not be the tool of choice.232 At first 
because the self-regulatory of companies’ conception is that “firms that would benefit from 
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greater female representation on boards would already have done so.”233 Secondly, the U.S. 
concerns regarding invasive quota laws are also shared by individual employees234, which fear to 
lose their credibility and stigmatization due to quota rules in the extremely competitive U.S. 
economy.235 This might be a reason, why also “a majority of American female directors are 
oppose quotas, even though they believe the strategy would be effective in increasing board 
diversity”.236 
Obligating U.S. corporations to give information about recruitment and promotion would 
facilitate comparing their performance to similar institutes, and for stakeholders to hold poor 
performers accountable. The government could demand transparency of board recruitment 
forcing corporations to disclose if female candidates were considered or interviewed. An even 
stronger approach would be to encourage corporations to adopt a version of the "Rooney Rule," 
applicable to professional football. The National Football League (NFL) requires teams to pledge 
to include a minority candidate among the finalists for each coaching and general manager 
position and to conduct an on-site interview with that finalist.230 In the seven years after "the 
rule was adopted in 2003, the number of black head coaches in the NFL increased from 6% to 
22%. Securities and Exchange Commissioner Luis Aguilar has suggested that "many corporate 
boards may need their own Rooney [R]ule ....  
 
Social Differences 
The specific historical background of the U.S. has its direct impact on local economic 
politics that leads directly to “impossibility”.237 Until today around 75% of corporate board seats 
are given to white men238 while in 66% of the Fortune 500 companies no women of color holds a 
board seat at all.239 Although the overall number of women and minorities on U.S. corporate 
boards grew in three decades from merely representation in 7% of corporate boards to 76% in 
2014240, the overall representation on boards remains rather low.241 But not alone women of 
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color have to struggle with social norms and strains, which keep them out of the top companies 
employments. Christian-fundamentalist communities, which are highly influential in some 
American states, are demanding a picture of women which is mainly or exclusively focused on 
the family care-work and not on carrier or individual fulfillment. 242 
This peer pressure on women in general could be the reason why in the U.S. quota laws 
are also highly contentious among those who are otherwise highly interested in women’s 
equality, especially by feminists.243 While this phenomenon is also known in Europe, the U.S. 
focus on labor-essentialism reinforces this quota obstacle.244 The double-tracked quota 
discussions in Europe, based on positive economic assumptions and fundamental values, seem to 
be unique in this case.245 
 
Conclusion: A Wrap-Up from the U.S. Perspective 
The United States is already facing great pressure to change, as the percentage of females 
on corporate boards has stalled over the last few years in the United States.246 If the government 
is set on implementing legislation to follow the trend in the EU, it needs to start with legislation 
that is modeled on the Rooney Rule. Force companies to put women at least in the position to get 
the job. The NFL did it, and teams have been surprised by the quality of the minority candidates 
they interviewed—so surprised that 14% more of the minorities were hired into head coaching 
positions than before the NFL implemented the rule.247 If corporate boards are given the same set 
of ground rules for their hiring practices, they too will be surprised by the quality of the 
candidates they receive. The SEC’s rules on disclosure were not strict enough and did not require 
companies to take any action. The rules are not specific to gender or racial diversity, and were 
admittedly “not intended to steer behavior.”248 Over 60 companies continue to fail to comply 
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with the SEC disclosure rules.249 Corporations need something that is stricter, more explicit, and 
actually works. Programs like the Rooney Rule will create change.  
The only programs that can be effective in the United States are strong top-down policies 
that are implemented by the corporations themselves. The corporations must be open and willing 
to hire women, and create the right work environment at the board level to create effective 
change. Peter Grauer, leader of the U.S. chapter of the 30% club, which aims for higher female 
representation globally on FTSE-100 boards, notes that “a mandatory quota isn’t the way to 
make [change] happen.”250 Barb Stinnett, one of the first female executives in the tech space in 
her role as director of worldwide sales for Hewlett-Packard, agrees with Grauer.251 Both Stinnett 
and Grauer agree that there is a fear of “token hires” with respect to the implementation of a 
mandatory quota in the U.S.252 No female board member wants to be seen as a token director, 
and no female board member wants her qualifications diminished because of the use of a 
mandatory quota.  
The U.S. has women out there that are ready to take on these roles in companies and 
ready for the added responsibility. They want these jobs, they have worked hard for these jobs, 
and they are prepared to succeed as board members. Fortune 500 companies just need a 
voluntary program or small piece of legislation to give them the nudge to start opening their 
doors to these women, in order to break down long held stereotypes.253 Bottom-up legislation 
requiring a set quota will not be effective—it will serve to setback any future female board 
members, who will be seen as “token hires” or “quota fillers.” The United States’ only option for 
affecting change is to take the admittedly slower, but more thorough route of top-down programs 
that force organizations to change from the top and from within, in order to create a work 
environment that will allow female executives to thrive and add value. The women are out there. 
The women are qualified and prepared. They can add value, but corporate America needs a 
push—or shove—in the right direction, so that it can take the first steps toward change on its 
own.   
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